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1  The Digital Transition as a Reality-Check for Plato’s 
Utopia Failure
Mary Midgley sees philosophy as plumbing, something that nobody notices until 
it goes wrong: ‘Then suddenly we become aware of some bad smells, and we have 
to take up the floorboards and look at the concepts of even the most ordinary piece 
of thinking. The great philosophers … noticed how badly things were going wrong, 
and made suggestions about how they could be dealt with.’ (Midgley 2001).
The bad smells, as I perceive them, concern the proliferation of truisms (includ-
ing about progress, change and innovation), wrong alternatives (“either/or” framing 
when the “both/and” would be much more efficient), and fears and delusion when 
it comes to thinking and speaking about politics and the public space. It would be 
wrong to say that we are in totalitarian times: fascism and communism have been 
defeated and democracy is alive, at least in the EU and other parts of the world. 
However, I feel that we are unconsciously undermining essential elements of the 
human condition, as set out by Hannah Arendt in her seminal book The human 
condition (Arendt 1959): the antidotes against the risk of totalitarianism are thereby 
weakened to a dangerous extent so that it would not take much more than a spark for 
the public space to collapse, and this even under the cover of the best governance 
intentions.
The digital transition is an opportunity to “fix the pipes”, as put by Mary Midg-
ley: it brings about a reality by which some key assumptions underlying our world-
view, since Plato, lose ground insofar as they simply stop being efficient. The digital 
transition projects us into a world where nature is pervasively intertwined with sen-
sors, information devices and machines; we thus increasingly experience a reactive 
and talkative nature, an animated nature, where it becomes more and more difficult 
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to distinguish between what is “given”1 and what is fabricated. Furthermore, the 
digital transition creates the worldly conditions for the actual dissolution of the 
objectivity standpoint: indeed, we “touch” the fact that the abundance of informa-
tion does not give access to an omniscient/omnipotent posture, but rather that ac-
cumulation of knowledge pushes ever further and redefines the remit of what is to 
be known. Like the sea recovering from the wave behind a boat, reality is thick and 
dense and recomposes itself, undermining any possibility to acquire or sustain a 
posture of omniscience and omnipotence.
It is paradoxical to realise that it is exactly when, and probably because, we can 
envisage what a total and ubiquitous knowledge would mean, that the omniscience/
omnipotence utopia can appear as a useless and deceptive fiction. By bringing us 
to the point where the omniscience/omnipotence utopia can indeed be seen as a 
chimera, the digital transition, in a paradoxical gesture, calls for re-endorsing the 
fact that human action2 is precisely characterized by its irreversibility and its un-
predictability, and this is not necessarily for the worse3. Arendt writes in the late 
fifties: “Exasperation with the threefold frustration of action—the unpredictability 
of its outcome, the irreversibility of the process, and the anonymity of its authors- is 
almost as old as recorded history. It has always been a great temptation, for men 
of action no less than for men of thought, to find a substitute for action in the hope 
that the realm of human affairs may escape the haphazardness and moral irrespon-
sibility inherent in a plurality of agents. The remarkable monotony of the proposed 
solutions throughout our recorded history testifies to the elemental simplicity of the 
matter. Generally speaking, they always amount to seeking shelter from action’s 
calamities in an activity where one man, isolated from all others, remains master 
of his doings from beginning to end [….] Plato’s solution of the philosopher-king, 
whose ‘wisdom’ solves the perplexities of action as though they were problems of 
1 In passing, one may challenge this common way to denote what is not fabricated! What is not 
fabricated is deemed to be ….given. The question arising immediately is then: why necessarily 
given by someone? Why this compulsion that is unveiled by this vocabulary to see a “Big Other”, 
behind everything that is?
2 The word “action” is to be understood as defined by Arendt in the Human Condition. Arendt pro-
poses to describe the vita activa by distinguishing three activities: labor, work and action. “Labor 
is the activity which corresponds to the biological process of the human body, whose spontaneous 
growth, metabolism and eventual decay are bound to the vital necessities produced and fed into the 
life process by labor. The human condition of labor is ife itself […].Work is the activity which cor-
responds to the unnaturalness of human existence, which is not embedded in, and whose mortality 
is not compensated by, the species’ ever-recurring life cycle. Work provides an “artificial” world 
of things, distinctly different from all natural surroundings […].The human condition of work is 
worldliness. Action, the only activity that goes on directly between men without the intermediary 
of things or matter, corresponds to the human condition of plurality, to the fact that men, not Man, 
live on the earth and inhabit the world. While all aspects of the human condition are somehow 
related to politics, this plurality is specifically the condition, not only the conditio sine qua non, 
but the conditio per quam—of all political life.” HC, pp. 9–10 (apart from the italics in the last 
sentence, which are from Arendt, the highlights earlier in the quote have been made by the author 
of this article in view of highlighting the distinctions between labor, work and action). HC, p. 9. 
More on this tripartition later.
3 More details about the shifts in the digital transition in the Onlife Background Note, Chap. 11.
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cognition, is only one –and by no means the less tyrannical- variety of one-man 
rule” (Arendt 1959, pp. 197–199).
Today, the regular call on the need for leadership and political will attest that not 
less than before, policy-making is pervaded by the quest of “seeking shelter from 
action’s calamities in an activity where one man, isolated from all others, remains 
master of his doings from beginning to end…” (Arendt 1959, p. 197) The perception 
that ideal freedom is best actualised in sovereignty, either at collective or individual 
levels, is the expression of the omnipotence component of the omniscience-omnip-
otence utopia, while the omniscience side of it is expressed by “the Platonic wish to 
substitute making for acting in order to bestow upon the realm of human affairs the 
solidity inherent in work and fabrication” (Arendt 1959, p. 202).
In my view, as I hope to make clear later in this contribution, policy-making 
continues to rely too much on the omniscience/omnipotence utopia. Do we not 
regularly frame problems in terms of “lack of knowledge”, as if perfect knowledge 
would allow perfect action? This argument, at the core of the rationale for funding 
research, reaches out beyond that specific purpose and pervades imaginaries. On the 
other hand, isn’t the precautionary principle based on the idea that it is somehow 
possible to foresee and avoid harmful consequences, as if making decisions was 
about making a choice between different courses of action, as we make a choice in 
a menu when ordering a meal in a restaurant?
Knowing, thinking, doing and acting can only be done from within (“building 
the raft while swimming”4) and not from an external manipulative perspective. Im-
manence is becoming commonsensical and is to be endorsed in political terms, 
without this meaning nihilism or despair. This calls for taking some distance from 
dramatisation, as a trick, and for recovering a meaningful approach to the present, 
based on a responsible and modest approach to the challenges of our times. Policy-
making should reclaim the present and take responsibility for the choices we make 
in view of generating “islands of predictability” (Arendt 1959, p. 220) and ensure 
that “meaning has a place in this world” (Arendt 1959, p. 212), while holding in 
contempt the fact that “real stories, in distinction from those we invent, have no 
author” (Arendt 1959, p. 165).
Arendt, with her notions of natality5 and plurality6, offers a sound basis for bal-
ancing the omniscience/omnipotence utopia and for making use of what I will call 
an Arendtian axiomatic reset in policy framing. Reclaiming natality and plurality 
allows aligning freedom with plurality, instead of seeing plurality as a constraint to 
freedom.
4 This is my take from this sentence brought about by Luciano Floridi and which became the motto 
of the Onlife initiative. See the Onlife Manifesto, Chap. 2.
5 Natality is not to be understood as “birth rate”. It is a technical term in Arendt’s thought express-
ing the fact that the human condition is characterized by the fact of birth at least as much as by the 
fact of death. For Arendt, the sustainability of the world is ensured by the fact men and women 
constantly come to the world by birth and freedom is intimately linked to the capacity to begin.
6 For the technical meaning of plurality, see later in this chapter, under 3.2.: Embracing Plurality.
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After having addressed the influence of the omniscience/omnipotence preju-
dice over policy-making, and after having presented how the notions of plurality 
and natality allow overcoming such prejudice, with the Arendtian axiomatic reset, 
I shall propose an actualisation of the distinction between the private and public 
and between agents, nature and artefacts. Building on these new distinctions, I shall 
propose to consider policy-making, not only in terms of seeking control over the fu-
ture, but also in being responsive to new meanings and providing the tools to allow 
agents to orient themselves in the world as it evolves and live a decent life.
2  Omniscience/Omnipotence: Modern Utopia, Human 
Condition’s Dystopia?
2.1  The Centrality of Control in Knowledge and Action
In scientific terms, humans are treated as mere scientific objects, i.e., they are eluci-
dated with a view to predict and/or to manipulate them7. As pointed out by Arendt, 
the scientific discourse is indexed on necessity: “what science and the quest of 
knowledge are after is irrefutable truth, that is, propositions human beings are not 
free to reject—they are compelling” (Arendt 1978, p. 59). In scientific terms, con-
tingency is just another name for “epistemic failure”, a not-yet-known. By denoting 
contingency with the term uncertainty, i.e., as a negative, certainty is made the norm 
or the ideal. And scientific knowledge is paired with certainty of facts, even after 
several decades of quantum mechanics, which rather teaches us that uncertainty and 
indeterminacy are intrinsic to scientific knowledge as well. This scientific register 
positions humans as an object of enquiry, a “material”, inherently heteronomous 
i.e., as fully determined by external materials, forces and processes.
When considered in ethical terms, as Arendt put it ironically, “attemps to define 
human nature almost invariably end with some construction of a deity…” (Arendt 
1959, p. 12). Furthermore, she reckons that freedom has wrongly been identified 
with sovereignty in political and philosophical thought: “If it were true that sov-
ereignty and freedom are the same, then indeed no man could be free, because 
sovereignty, the ideal of uncompromising self-sufficiency and mastership, is con-
tradictory to the very condition of plurality. No man can be sovereign because not 
one man, but men, inhabit the earth—and not, as the tradition since Plato holds, 
because of man’s limited strength, which makes him depend upon the help of oth-
ers” (Arendt 1959, p. 210). Understanding freedom as sovereignty has a huge price, 
the price of reality: “sovereignty is possible only in imagination, paid for by the 
price of reality” (Arendt 1959, p. 211). Ethical/philosophical narratives of what it 
is to be human contend with the need to escape from, or at least to balance with, 
7 In passing, no wonder machine will end-up being like humans, since we have patiently paved the 
way for that by thinking of humans as machines: “Thought itself, when it became ‘reckoning with 
consequences’, became a function of the brain, with the result that electronic instruments are found 
to fulfil these functions much better than we ever could.”—HC, p. 294.
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a set of “things to-be-avoided”: the scientifically-induced heteronomy as set out 
above with the second categorical imperative of Kant8, and the Hobbesian “state 
of nature” and “war of all against all”. “Humanity” in ethical terms is defined as a 
common opposite to these stance-to-be-avoided: human-as-a-machine, human-as-
a-self-defeated-violent-and-careless-individual. This violent and careless aspect is 
by the way strangely referred to our animality, as if being human was defined as 
being different from animals.
A common feature of these scientific and ethical/philosophical approaches of 
what it is to be human is “control”: when in scientific terms, control by others 
(including by myself-subject on myself-object); when in ethical terms, self-control 
(including with the help of God-as-a-reference) or control on the future course of 
events (freedom-as-sovereignty). But control, when decontextualized and pushed 
beyond its relevant remit, has more to do with destruction than with anything else, 
while action is precisely characterised by its unpredictability, hence the inherent 
impossibility to control its consequences: “Whereas men have always been capable 
of destroying whatever was the product of human hands and have become capable 
today even of the potential destruction of what man did not make –the earth and 
earthly nature- men never have been and never will be able to undo or even to con-
trol reliably any of the processes they start through action” (Arendt 1959, pp. 208–
209). Hence, seeking control beyond what can reasonably be predicted has also a 
high price, the price of plurality and freedom!
2.2  Policy-Making or the Victory of the Animal Laborans?
In “the Vita activa and the Modern Age” section of The Human Condition (Arendt 
1959) , Arendt explains how the invention of the telescope changed the relation-
ship between truth and appearance. “Truth was no longer supposed to appear…to 
the mental eye of a beholder” (Arendt 1959, p. 263). Indeed, as the telescope has 
demonstrated that we are fooled by our senses, “nothing could be less trustworthy 
for acquiring knowledge and approaching truth than passive observation or mere 
contemplation. In order to be certain, one had to make sure, and in order to know, 
one had to do” (Arendt 1959, p. 263). The telescope has undermined deeply and 
for centuries our epistemological confidence in what we perceive without instru-
ments, either by our senses or by mere thinking and contemplation. As a result, “in 
modern philosophy and thought, doubt occupies much the same central position as 
that occupied for all the centuries before by the Greek thaumazein, the wonder at 
everything that is as it is” (Arendt 1959, p. 249). This has had a great effectiveness 
in the relationship with nature and the universe. Without the Cartesian “de omnibus 
dubitandum est” (“everything should be doubted”), we would not have taken the 
same technological path nor landed on the moon. The Cartesian doubt has shaped 
the relationship of men to nature in terms of questions to be answered through 
8 “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any 
other, never merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an end.”
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experimental settings, and this has opened an era where, on the one hand, technolog-
ical artefacts have been invented and widely spread, and where, on the other hand, 
the conscience of the finiteness and fragility of the earth and the environment sur-
rounding us has arisen. The relationship between men and nature is made of triumph 
and pride, on the one hand, for all the technological artefacts, and fear and guilt, on 
the other hand, for the consequences of having “disturbed” the global ecosystem to 
the point that we are now feeling responsibility for it9. It is against this general back-
ground that the development, diffusion and uptake of information and communica-
tion technologies take place. If there is no doubt that the Cartesian doubt has played 
a decisive role in this course of action, the disappearance of thaumazein (“wonder”) 
has had great damaging consequences, at least in the field of human affairs.
Having been fooled by our senses until Galileo and Copernicus did not prevent 
humanity from living on the earth and no longer being fooled by our senses did not 
prevent humanity from committing the notorious monstrosities of the twentieth cen-
tury. The suspicion against thinking and contemplating, in favour of the confidence 
in doing, has led, first, to the reversal of the primacy of the vita contemplativa over 
of the vita activa, and, second, within the vita activa, it has modified the hierarchy10 
of the labour-work-action tripartition by putting work over action. Indeed, work is 
the activity of the doer, par excellence, and a telescope is an object produced by 
Homo Faber.
The signature of this reversal in today’s policy-making is the importance of the 
“means-to-end” or instrumental logic, testified by the sequence: objectives, strate-
gies, implementation, monitoring. Policies are meant to be means to higher ends. 
The risk of this means-to-end logic in policy-making is to consider that any means 
is good as long as it serves the end. Another shortcoming of importing the means-
to-end logic in the political realm is to lock-in or close down the capacity to begin. 
Indeed, the Homo Faber is judged against the conformity of his work with the origi-
nal plan. But the political leader will not: “In contradistinction to fabrication, where 
the light by which to judge the finished product is provided by the image or model 
perceived beforehand by the craftsman’s eye, the light that illuminates processes of 
action, and therefore all historical processes, appears only at their end” (Arendt 
1959, p. 171). Indeed, political actors know that their mandate cannot only be cap-
tured by a mere implementation of the original strategy. For example, although 
EU202011 is the overarching strategy of the Commission, it will be judged, not only 
on the implementation of this strategy, but more surely on its sense of opportunity in 
dealing appropriately with the crisis and the other events as they arise, in the course 
9 The term Anthropocene has been coined to hint at this. “It is an informal geologic chronological 
term that serves to mark the evidence and extent of human activities that have had a significant 
global impact on the Earth’s ecosystems.” In http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthropocene, page 
view January 11, 2013.
10 In her description of the vita activa, Arendt establishes a clear hierarchy between labor, work 
and action. Labor stands at the lower end of the hierarchy because it is indexed on necessity and 
action at the higher end, because it is indexed on freedom. Work stands in between.
11 COM (2010) 2020 final. Europe 2020: A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth.
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of time, and on its ability to take initiatives. Similarly in national contexts, electoral 
campaigns are never won only on mere implementation of past promises but also on 
the ability to generate trust and confidence with a winning mix of vision and skilful 
sense of opportunism. Hence, even if it would be stupid to deny that policy-making 
should be transparent, soundly-based and monitored, it would be as stupid to think 
that transparency, sound foundations and monitoring is all that matters. Instead, 
what really matters is the ability to deal with the unexpected and make sense of it. 
Policy-makers are judged on this very ability, their ability to begin, to impulse and 
to make sense, much more than on their ability to achieve pre-defined goals.
One of the main current higher ends to which policy-making is deemed to be 
a means is “boosting growth and jobs”. This in itself has also been anticipated by 
Arendt, even if, in the ’50s and ’60s of the last century, there were no “growth and 
jobs” issue at the level they are today. She anticipated that beyond the reversal of 
action and fabrication, or the “victory of Homo Faber”, there would be a second 
reversal, i.e., that the lowest of the three activities in the vita activa tripartition—la-
bor—would take over work and action with the “victory of the Animal Laborans”. 
Labor is the lowest of the three activities in the vita activa, because it is defined 
by Arendt as “bound to the vital necessities” (Arendt 1959, p. 9). It is indexed on 
necessity. It is highly repetitive and leaves no trace behind. It is also characterized 
by its processual nature, i.e. the fact that it is continuous and has no beginning nor 
end. Labour, in that meaning, does not allow any room for experiencing freedom, 
nor the pleasure of appearing in front of others and experiencing the joy of plural-
ity. Indeed, for Arendt, what makes us human is what happens, once each of us has 
coped with the necessities of the biological life: “The ‘good life’ as Aristotle called 
the life of the citizen, therefore was ….‘good’ to the extent that by having mastered 
the necessities of sheer life, by being freed from labor and work, and by overcoming 
the innate urge of all living creatures for their own survival, it was no longer bound 
to the biological life process” (Arendt 1959, p. 33).
The “means-to-end” register that has invaded the public space turns itself into an 
even more pervasive register: the processual register. Policy-making has not only 
substituted making for acting, but it has further substituted processing for making. 
This is a negative trend, according to Arendt, because processes leave no room for 
plurality and freedom, or for meaning. The policy’s increasing and almost exclu-
sive focus on processes thereby leaves unattended a central aspect of the human 
 condition.
One of the key features of the human condition is that human beings do not need 
to allocate the totality of their energy to their survival: a surplus is available. Human 
beings, if and when healthy, have a satiety threshold: at one point they have enough: 
they are not hungry, not cold, clean…and can turn to other activities, for example 
engaging with others or fabricating objects. That satiety threshold, or better what 
happens beyond it, is what allows us to experience the human condition as such and 
enjoy freedom.
With the centrality of the “growth and jobs” rationale in policy-making, process 
and necessity have pervaded the rationale for policy-making. Necessity has been 
hijacked to cover the survival needs of enterprises, rather than those of human be-
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ings. These organisational beings have no satiety threshold. For them, by design, 
“more” is “better” and “enough” not part of their vocabulary! Addressing needs of 
a-satiable beings, or, in other words, of beings not having a satiety threshold, leads 
to the hegemony of necessity at the expense of any sense of freedom and plural-
ity. It is in this sense that what Arendt calls “the social” has indeed colonised the 
public space. Wealth, which was a typical private concern in Greek times, became 
a dominant public concern. With an endless processual perspective anchored in ne-
cessity, and the oversight or denial of the notion of satiety threshold, phronesis, i.e. 
practical wisdom and prudence, a critical value for public action in the Greek polis, 
is substituted by hubris, i.e. extreme pride, arrogance and “never-enoughness” in a 
systemic way.
Facing this “growth and jobs” rationale, indexed on the needs of a-satiable or-
ganisations, there is another rationale: the one of precaution and fundamental rights. 
The a-satiability of organisations and their overarching influence on policy-making 
in the name of growth and jobs may distort the use of these counter-tracks, as they 
are sometimes put forward in absolute and irrealistic terms, with the purpose to 
counter the endless voracity of enterprises, as organisational beings. The problem 
is that this mechanical approach fails to grasp meanings, on both sides. Hence, 
policy-making is locked in a vision, which is either superseded by the overarching 
objective of “boosting growth and jobs” or by the quest for control, certainty and 
predictability. In Arendtian terms, one might say that policy-making is disconnected 
from endorsing the openness of the future, through a double regression, first by run-
ning away from freedom by invoking causality, i.e., with work taking precedence 
over action, and then by redoubling causality with necessity, i.e., with labour taking 
precedence over work. The loss of this double regression is plurality and meaning.
2.3  Policy-Making and the Devaluation of the Present
The modern overarching confidence in progress and the lock-in of policy-making 
in causality (means-to-end) and necessity (process) has deep consequences for the 
underlying representations of the past, the present and the future in policy-making: 
meaning and purpose are exported in the future, the present is …what is broken, the 
past balances between “golden age” and “never again”!
Future is where meaning and purpose are stored: future generations are called 
to justify policies, notably regarding climate change policies. Long-term objectives 
are set, against which current decisions are justified. The long-term perspective is 
value-loaded, unveiling interestingly that the short term has indeed been emptied 
of meaning and purpose. “Short termism” is an expression denoting the inability 
of policy making to form appropriate judgments of what needs to be taken into ac-
count. It is the signature of the fact that policy decisions have parted company with 
meaning. This is highly problematic in the perspective of natality and plurality, as 
will be shown later.
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The past is either idealised or demonised, much more rarely simply endorsed, 
acknowledged and made sense of in a rationale and distanced manner.
The present is what is broken. It is indeed mainly perceived and described as 
what is broken and requires action to be fixed! Policies are then designed to fix 
those problems: low-carbon, training, budgetary discipline. The present is where 
problems lie and the future where solutions need to be found. Tomorrow will be 
better than today, thanks to the policies. As if there would be no need for policies 
or institutions if there were no problem to be fixed. In that framing, the bigger the 
problems and the worse the present, the easier the demonstration! Metaphorically, 
policy-makers tend to describe the challenges as if we had to run away from a fire 
or to hurry up to win a supposed race. It is about pointing to the future as a fire exit 
from a present in flames. This systematic, even if implicit, devaluation of the pres-
ent has pervasive consequences on the mood with which men and women interact 
with each other and with the world. It undermines the possibilities for a rich experi-
ence of plurality and freedom.
3  The Arendtian Axiomatic Reset
“The Platonic separation of knowing and doing has remained at the root of all 
theories of domination which are not mere justifications of an irreducible and ir-
responsible will to power” (Arendt 1959, p. 201). This dualism between knowing 
and doing mirrors the dualism between soul and body, between reason and emo-
tion, between higher ends and mere means, etc… This dualism which seems to be 
designed in order to keep one of the polarities at a distance is bound to fail, because 
what is kept at a distance springs with even more strength than if it were recognized 
and dealt with. Understanding –or rather standing under- the failure of the omni-
science/omnipotence utopia as the ground from which the human condition can be 
experienced and appreciated is a critical mental operation that we suggest can be 
called an “axiomatic reset”.
This axiomatic reset called for by Arendt stems from the lessons she draws from 
the darkest times of the twentieth century: seeking to confer to human affairs the 
solidity of the world of objects leads to monstrosities. This can be seen as a political 
version of the Heisenberg principle. This principle states that measuring the speed 
of a particle can only be done at the expense of changing its position: hence, to 
know the speed, you “pay the price” of not knowing its position and vice-versa. The 
political version of this principle, as highlighted by Arendt, goes as follows: if cer-
tainty is to be trumped over any other considerations, then we get only one outcome, 
the certainty of the worse! There cannot be certainty of the good and it is often good 
enough to ensure that the worst does not happen. This is not to say that nothing can 
be known, nor that nothing should be controlled, but it means that overestimating 
what can be controlled bears heavy consequences.
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This is why Arendt inspires me thinking that the omniscience/omnipotence uto-
pia is a fertile ground for totalitarianism. This is why she has repeatedly refused to 
be considered a political philosopher.
The Arendtian axiomatic reset is acknowledging natality and embracing plurality.
3.1  Acknowledging Natality
Humans are not only mortal beings. They are also born beings! With some irony, 
and a mental smile, Arendt wonders why philosophers have always considered mor-
tality more important than natality, and ends more important than beginnings. She 
invites to pay much more attention to the fact that we are born beings: “Death is the 
price we pay for having lived12”. Her philosophy is anchored in the praise of begin-
nings. What makes the world sustainable is precisely that human beings come to the 
world in a continuous flow.
Indeed, looking at human beings as beginners brings a radically different per-
spective than looking at them as beings that will eventually die. Let’s call the latter 
the perspective of mortality and the former the perspective of natality.
The mainstream timeline representation, where the future (our death) is in front 
of us, and the past (our birth) is behind us, flows from the perspective of mortality. 
Acknowledging natality invites a shift in this representation. It is to privilege a vi-
sion of the future as what is yet to come. In the perspective of natality, the future is 
pushing us forward, instead of being what we foresee and anticipate. In that sense, 
the future is behind us rather than in front of us13, because we do not see it, while 
the past is what we contemplate and learn from.
Let’s illustrate this shift in perspectives by another couple of spatial metaphors: 
a road versus a spring. In the perspective of mortality, the timeline is like a road 
from birth to death: the present is like the point on the road where the pilgrim stands 
walking towards his/her destination, symbolized as the heaven, the grail or just 
the end. In the perspective of natality, the present is like a spring, where time, like 
water, flows from within the earth, and we spend our life in the present, i.e. where 
the water comes out.
In the perspective of mortality, the future is coloured with the certainty of our 
eventual death, while in the perspective of natality it is coloured by the recurrent 
remembrance of the “infinite improbability” (Arendt 1959) of our birth. In the 
perspective of natality, the fact that we shall eventually die does not account for 
a meaningful knowledge of the future; what shall eventually make sense and be 
worthwhile in the future is precisely what shall come as a surprise, as each of us 
as human beings came to this world. In that latter perspective, it is recognized that 
12 Retro-translation by the author of the Denktagebuch French version “La mort est le prix que 
nous payons pour la vie, pour le fait d’avoir vécu.” In Journal de Pensée, vol. 2. Paris: Editions du 
Seuil, p. 977 (July 1970, § 66).
13 The metaphorical approach to the timeline owes much to Lakoff and Johnson’s Metaphors We 
Live By (1984).
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“what is” is the accumulation of infinite improbabilities, more than the predictable 
outcome according to causal laws. While the perspective of mortality is conducive 
to doubt and control, the perspective of natality is conducive to confidence and 
wonder.
3.2  Embracing Plurality
Plurality has been mentioned regularly in this contribution: it is time now be more 
specific about what Arendt means with this word. As already been mentioned, for 
Arendt, the noblest part of the human condition is not that Man mimics a monothe-
ist God, but instead that there is plurality: “If philosophers, despite their necessary 
estrangement from the everyday life of human affairs, were ever to arrive at a true 
political philosophy, they would have to make the plurality of men, out of which 
arises the whole realm of human affairs –in its grandeur and misery- the object 
of their thaumazein. […] They would have to accept in something more than the 
resignation of human weakness the fact that ‘it is not good for man to be alone’” 
(Arendt 2005, pp. 38–39).
Arendt describes plurality as the coexistence of equality, specificity and reflec-
tivity.
First, equality is the component of plurality that denotes the fact that plurality 
is what happens between agents who recognize each other as other selves. In that 
meaning, equality is not considered as an objective, but as an axiomatic stance. Plu-
rality is what happens between agents, who consider each other as other selves…
Second, specificity, because what makes each human a human qua human is 
precisely his or her distinctness and uniqueness. As long as we treat other humans 
as interchangeable entities or as characterised by their attributes or qualities, i.e., as 
a what, we do not treat them as human qua human, but as entities that happen to be 
human. Plurality is what happens between agents who consider each other as other 
selves and who recognize an absolute specificity to each self, to the point where this 
specificity trumps any other characteristic to denote their identity…
Last and by no means least, the third component of plurality is the reflective na-
ture of identity. For Arendt, the disclosure of the who “can almost never be achieved 
as a willful purpose, as though one possessed and could dispose of this ‘who’ in the 
same manner he has and can dispose of his qualities” (Arendt 1959, p. 159), (i.e., 
his what). The who appears unmistakably to others, but remains somewhat hidden 
from the self. It is as if our identity layed in an entity standing on our shoulder or 
on the back of our head and was visible by all except by oneself. Our face, which 
represents oneself for others, is never seen by our self through his or her own eyes. 
It is this reflective character of identity that confer to speech and action such a 
revelatory role when it comes to disclosing the who and not the what. For entities 
for whom the who matters, appearance in front of others, notably with speech and 
action, is a necessary condition for revealing his or her identity: “Action and speech 
are so closely related because the primordial and specifically human act must at the 
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same time contain the answer to the question asked of every newcomer: who are 
you? […]In acting and speaking, men show who they are, they reveal actively their 
unique personal identities and thus make their appearance in the human world[…]. 
Revelatory quality of speech and action comes to the fore where people are with 
others and neither for, nor against them, that is in sheer togetherness” (Arendt 
1959, pp. 158–160).
In other words, identity is a double-key feature: one key is held by the self and 
one key is held by the other. Without this second key—the key held by the other—
identity is not completed. This is why appearance to others in a public space is a 
central feature of the human condition. It also highlights why identity and interac-
tions are so intimately connected14, and why attention15 is such a critical ability for 
human beings to experience plurality.
To sum up, plurality is what happens between agents who consider other as other 
selves, whose identity is inherently singular and partly hidden to the self, so that 
appearance among equals is the only way to disclose fully and experience one’s 
own identity16.
3.3  Plurality-and-Natality as an Alternative 
to Omniscience-and-Omnipotence
Omniscience and omnipotence are deemed to be postures from which anything, 
including the realization of any utopia, is possible, provided sufficient knowledge 
and control would be available. In an omniscience-omnipotence utopia’s world-
view, relationships create no surprise, as a relationship is deemed to be a causal 
one. In that perspective, the totality of the meaning lies in the cause. There is no 
room for meaning in an effect. An effect is soluble in its cause. An effect is not even 
an end. It is literally a non-event, since the event is all included in the cause. The 
omnipotence/omniscience utopia echoes the mortality perspective set out above. 
It closes down the opening to beginnings and is antinomic to thaumazein, as what 
deserves wonder, in the omniscience-omnipotence utopia’s worldview, is only… 
omniscience and omnipotence!
The perspective of natality counters the omniscience-omnipotence utopia with-
out falling into the drawbacks of nihilism, because it encapsulates the confidence in 
recurrent beginnings.
Plurality is the second element of this alternative to an omniscience-omnipotence 
utopia. Indeed, as we have seen above, the key features of plurality are that each 
entity engaged in the relationship is (i) equal (all on the same ground), (ii) singular 
(each who is unique) and (iii) partly hidden to him or herself (the reflective charac-
14 See Sect. 3D of the Onlife Background Note, Chap. 11.
15 The critical importance of attention is at the core of the chapter of Stefana Broadbent and Claire 
Lobet-Maris.
16 There is resonance between plurality and the approach of the relational self as proposed by 
Charles Ess in his chapter as well as with the related section in the Onlife Manifesto.
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ter of identity). This threefold understanding of plurality (equality, specificity, and 
reflectivity) undermines radically an omniscience-omnipotence utopia’s worldview. 
Indeed, the equality between the engaged persons or entities subvert the asymme-
try created by the polarization in terms of cause and effect; the specificity of each 
entity is a firewall against considering someone as an effect soluble in a cause or as 
a bundle of attributes, hence, it is an anchor against instrumentalisation; lastly, the 
partly hidden identity undermines the omniscient-omnipotent utopia, as each of us 
has to admit that s/he needs the others to access to his or her identity.
From this understanding of plurality and natality springs a specific understand-
ing of human freedom. Human freedom is not about avoiding, escaping or vanish-
ing limits or about being as close as possible to omniscience and omnipotence, but 
it is instead anchored in the capacity to begin, to live among peers and access to our 
own identity through their recognition of our speech and action.
“Since action is the political activity par excellence, natality and not mortal-
ity, may be the central category of political, as distinguished from metaphysical, 
thought” (Arendt 1959, p. 11): the omniscience and omnipotence utopia, as an un-
derlying rationale for policy-making, can thus be seen as an ill-defined transposition 
of a metaphysical thought into a political thought. And this ill-defined transposition 
threatens to collapse the public space.
For these reasons, it is important to nurture natality and plurality, as powerful 
antidotes and alternatives to omniscience and omnipotence. Like the Thracian ser-
vant girl laughing about Thales falling in the well while looking at the stars17, the 
natality-plurality tenant is laughing at the aspirant to omniscience-omnipotence try-
ing hard to jump over his or her shadow18.
4  Reclaiming Distinctions in the Light of Plurality 
and Natality
4.1  Public and Private
For Arendt, the private space is where necessities are dealt with and the public space 
is where men— and I will add women19—enjoy plurality and freedom, through the 
revelatory character of speech and action: “life without speech and without action 
[…] has ceased to be a human life because it is no longer lived among men” (Arendt 
17 Famous anecdote in Plato, Theaetetus, 174A.
18 In Configuring the networked self (2012). New Haven: Yale University Press, Julie Cohen is 
providing a remarkable analysis of the policy challenges in a hyperconnected era, in a natality and 
plurality perspective. I see a great proximity between natality, as set out here, and her “semantic 
discontinuity”.
19 The gender reading of Arendt is a most interesting issue that is not addressed in this contri-
bution. Those interested may enjoy Feminist Interpretations of Arendt, edited by Bonnie Honig 
(1995. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.).
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1959, p. 157). In her view, the public is loaded with more ontological dignity than 
the private, because it is where freedom can be experienced.
The private, as still visible in the etymology, meant originally to be deprived 
from being among equals. Nowadays, privacy is hardly understood as “being de-
prived” from anything! On the contrary: freedom is more on the side of the private, 
and the rule of law on the side of the public. Property is associated with wealth and 
accumulation, while property and wealth used to be only the pre-condition for en-
gaging in the public realm. Action has been substituted by behaviours, or by fabrica-
tion. In tyranny, as in mass society, “men have become entirely private, that is, they 
have been deprived of seeing and hearing others, of being seen and being heard by 
them” (Arendt 1959, p. 53).
Freedom has changed sides: privacy is now perceived as one way to protect 
freedom, while publicity is more perceived as the realm of constraints (rule of law, 
accountability, transparency, justification, surveillance, etc…), than as the realm of 
enjoying plurality and freedom.
It is interesting to note that Arendt attributes the dissolution of the public/private 
distinction and the profound change of their meaning to political modernity. In her 
terms, the invasion of the social in the public realm, in the form of the nation state, 
which can be seen as a huge household, joined up with the ancestral “great temp-
tation, for men of action no less than for men of thought, to find a substitute for 
action in the hope that the realm of human affairs may escape the haphazardness 
and moral irresponsibility inherent in a plurality of agents” (Arendt 1959, p. 197).
The Arendtian axiomatic reset is not about going back to the Greek polis: push-
ing labour and work out of the public sphere, and concentrating politics on action 
only is not a credible option in the twenty-first century. However, the Arendtian 
tripartition of the vita activa in labour, work and action remains inspirational as 
it reminds us that labour (and necessity) and work (and causality) cannot account 
for the totality of the human experience: action (and plurality and freedom) has to 
have a place! For Arendt, the meaning of politics is freedom. If indeed, omnipo-
tence and omniscience were a possibility, there would be no room for politics, as 
politics is precisely the place where we experience the noblest part of the human 
condition, i.e. plurality and natality. In the vita activa of the twenty-first century, the 
labour-work-action tripartition should not be seen hierarchically, i.e., with action, 
the public and the agora on the top and labour, the private and the home on the bot-
tom: instead, labour, work and action form a trio generating a 3D-space. Failing to 
recognize action as a third dimension ends up in a degenerative perception of the 
human condition and a flattening of the human experience.
Arendt mapped the private/public distinction with idealized representations of 
the home and the agora as they were supposed to be in Greek Antiquity. There and 
then, the private was the household, the place where women and slaves took care of 
the necessities of life, while the public was the space where men, freed from the ne-
cessities of life, could experience freedom, among equals. It is obvious that the pub-
lic/private distinction does not correspond anymore to the distinction agora/home. It 
is my view that the public/private distinction can most usefully be redescribed in the 
twenty-first century by indexing it primarily on the freedom/necessity polarity, and 
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by leaving aside the space distinction (household vs. agora), or the gender or social 
one (men vs. women and slaves).
With that in mind, the private realm is where and when humans are bound by 
necessity, deprived from appearance among equals, and thereby, confined in a pre-
political, infra-human life, while the public realm is where and when human be-
ings experience plurality, i.e. equality, specificity and reflectivity, notably through 
speech and action. The experience of appearing to others as a who or as a what has 
little to do with the place where the relationship takes place. Consequently, the dis-
tinction between the public and the private has more to do with what is at stake in 
the relationship rather than where it takes place.
If we are considered, not as ourselves, but as a number (ID-number), an attribute 
(the amount of wealth, or a set of skills) or as a function (a consumer, a parent, a job 
holder), this is not a public appearance, but rather a private setting even if the rela-
tionship is between a so-called private entity and a so-called public entity. Indeed, 
then, the who does not matter; there is no plurality, but only functional interactions 
that can be modelled, calculated, and anticipated. This functional approach to re-
lationships is close to what was meant by being confined in the home, as the home 
is the metaphor for the place where persons, instead of appearing to others for who 
they are, are confined to fulfilling the tasks they are expected to.
Arendt recognizes that plurality can best be experienced at city-level. “The larg-
er the population in any given body politic, the more likely it will be the social 
rather than the political that constitutes the public realm” (Arendt 1959, p. 39). The 
Nation-State is where conformity and mass behaviour substitutes for plurality. This 
can then only be worse for continental organisations, such as the EU, or for global 
governance bodies, such as the UN! With big numbers, plurality degenerates into 
mere and unendorsed interdependence, while natality and its inherent openness and 
unpredictability are perceived only under the categories of uncertainty and risk.
4.2  Agents, Artefacts and Nature
Reclaiming a public/private distinction where the public is where plurality is expe-
rienced while the private is the realm of functionality leads to the need to recognize 
that plurality can also apply to intermediaries, legal entities, organisations, insti-
tutions, not only to humans. Let’s call ‘agents’ those beings who recognize their 
interactions with the other beings as one of plurality, i.e. beings (i) granting other 
similar beings with equal status to themselves, (ii) appearing for their who and be-
ing recognized as such, and (iii) partly blind to themselves and aware that it is by 
their appearance to others that they experience identity and freedom.
With that in mind, the EU can be seen as a public space where Member States, 
as agents, experience plurality. The EU can then be seen as a space of appearance 
for Member States, where they disclose their “who” and not their “what” and where 
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they depend upon each other to experience who they are. The same applies at UN 
level. Privileging plurality over functionality is recognizing that, for the public 
space, reaching goals matter much less than securing a space where agents whose 
identities are singular and reflective interact together in a constructive and meaning-
ful way20. It is also recognizing that freedom does not flaw from sovereignty and 
power but from interactions and meanings.
This characterisation of agents, be they human or not, as beings acknowledging 
that their freedom is anchored in plurality rather than in sovereignty, offers also a 
criterion for distinguishing agents from artefacts. Indeed, we suggest stating that 
agents are those beings with a who that matters, while artefacts are those beings 
whose identity correspond only to their external and functional description, i.e., be-
ings for which the what (and maybe the how) only matters. An artefact is an entity 
whose function corresponds to what it is meant for. It is fully heteronomous. Go-
ing back to Arendt tripartition, i.e., labour, work, action, artefacts are the outcome 
of work, while agents are those engaged in action. Hence, the difference between 
agents and artefacts cannot be based on objective differences about their essence, 
but rather on the type of interactions they are engaged with, i.e. either plurality or 
functionality, or put in other words, action or work. If humans are considered only 
for their attributes or the tasks they have to fulfil or the role they have to play, al-
though they are humans, they are artefactualized, and this only by the way they are 
represented, but nonetheless very effectively. Once someone is represented as an 
artefact, there is no further barrier against considering him or her as such.
So, agents are those beings self-aware that plurality is a key component of their 
own condition, i.e. those beings granting other similar beings the triple recognition 
underlying plurality: (i) the recognition that they are equal, (ii) the recognition that 
they are unique and specific, and (iii) the recognition that they are in need of the 
others to experience their own identity and freedom.
Then, if agents are those who, aware of their plurality, inhabit the world and 
shape it, notably with artefacts they build and control, nature can then be defined as 
what is beyond the control of agents, what stands around them. It includes artefacts, 
sensors, even robots to the extent that they escape agents’ control, and have become 
part of the environment that they have to navigate within and make sense of. This 
artefactual nature is the reservoir of new beginnings, as we used to consider “virgin 
nature” to be, before sustainability issues arose.
Hence, the difference between nature and artefacts is not anymore based on the 
difference between what is “given”, on the one hand, and what is fabricated, on the 
other hand, but rather on the difference between what is beyond our control, on the 
one hand, and what is under control, on the other hand. Of course, this has also in-
cidences on the distinction between what we have to cope with and what we can be 
held responsible21 for. The dividing line separating the remit of fate from the remit 
of responsibility is changing in function of time, space, and scale or granularity. 
20 This echoes with Richard Rorty in Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, Cambridge University 
Press, 1989; and with the notion of multi-agent-systems (MAS) as proposed by Luciano Floridi 
in his chapter.
21 Responsibility issues are developed by Ugo Pagallo and Judith Simon in their respective chap-
ters.
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Practical wisdom in a hyperconnected era consists, for each agent, be they humans, 
organisations, or institutions, in acknowledging where this dividing line lies, in each 
life situation, and in a perspective of natality and plurality.
Mistaking agents for artefacts brings about a world whose horizon is omni-
science and omnipotence, and comes dangerously close to totalitarianist forms of 
thinking. Mistaking nature for artefacts lead to misallocation of responsibilities, 
either by overestimating them or underestimating them22.
5  The Arendtian Axiomatic Reset  
in a Hyperconnected Era
5.1  The Proper Mix of Literacy and Policy…
If action is indeed characterised as a beginning whose consequences can never be 
undone, scientific discoveries and technological developments are action by excel-
lence, as they cannot be undone and correspond to new beginnings. Thinking about 
what happens to us and framing the challenges in a hyperconnected era is one of 
our generation’s tasks, and this ought to be done by balancing fears with confidence 
and control with wonder. Indeed, to reinforce and nurture the public space in a hy-
perconnected era, there is an urgent need to balance the omniscience-omnipotence 
utopia, pervaded by fear and control-seeking, with the plurality and natality per-
spectives, pervaded by confidence and wonder. This balancing generates a space 
where fears and risks are compensated by the confidence in beginnings, shared 
intelligence and practical wisdom. It generates a space where meanings are rooted 
in “in-betweens” rather than in “the more, the better” and where challenges are ap-
proached with “both/and” dualities rather than with “either/or” dilemmas.
To some extent, it invites to shift away from the dominance of a risk governance 
approach to a literacy approach. Literacy is the set of skills, understood in a wide 
sense, which enables the experience of plurality. Hence, abilities to communicate 
are central to literacy understood in the wide sense. In a pre-digital context, literacy 
is about reading and writing, but it goes much beyond the technical ability and 
reaches out to the ability to understand, to contextualize and to be persuasive. For 
example, each of us learn very young and, most often, very painfully, the subtleties 
of communication. We all experienced the differences between what we want to say 
to our mother or to our best friend, or between what we want to say in confidence, 
and what we want to say loud and clear. When things go wrong, we learn and we 
adapt, and little by little, we acquire that extended literacy. Literacy is made of a mix 
of technical, social and ethical skills and considerations. It is also highly evolutive. 
22 This echoes the point made in the paragraph 2.1. of the Onlife Manifesto: “…it is hard to iden-
tify who has control of what, when and within which scope. Responsibilities and liabilities are hard 
to allocate clearly and endorse unambiguously”.
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As put nicely by Siva Vaidhyanathan23, in the hyperconnected era, “we are all ba-
bies”! Indeed, who is aware of what is accessible to whom when engaging on social 
networks, browsing on the internet, buying online, walking around with a mobile 
phone on, etc... Acquiring a digital literacy24 is a collective and societal endeavour 
that requires an uptake and “naturalisation” of knowledge and codes, about the dif-
ferent modes of communication in a hyperconnected era, and their consequences 
for plurality. It is about adapting common sense, fairness, respect, responsibility, 
freedom, and privacy into the new worldly conditions. Shaping this new version of 
literacy, which can be called a digital literacy, is an emergent and ongoing process: 
there is no monopoly for taking part in such a game. Policy making has surely a 
contribution to make in this endeavour, but it would be wrong to believe that policy 
can deliver such literacy, as it is wrong to believe that policy could prevent risk in 
an absolute manner. In the societal and multi-stakeholder endeavour of shaping this 
emerging literacy, there is a role for policy-making, as there is a role for each other 
stakeholder. Policy-making, by being aware of the current emergence of new forms 
of literacy, can identify where and how it can be responsive and add value to the 
workings of societal intelligence and the ongoing reshaping of the value content of 
notions such as privacy or identity, and adapt the policy frameworks accordingly25. 
This is not an easy task, as it may call for fundamental and uncomfortable revi-
sions, leading to very sensitive transitions. In the next section, we will exemplify 
how policy and literacy can complement each other to address new challenges in a 
hyperconnected reality.
5.2  Coping With the Risk of “Reality Theft”
There are circumstances where it is accepted that fooling each other is part of the 
game: for example, on the April fool’s day. It is also societally acceptable to fool 
someone to his or her own advantage, for example with a surprise party on his or 
her birthday, or else to fool someone with his or her consent, for example in artistic 
performances, where it is particularly appreciated when the scenery and the perfor-
mance is close to reality so that it is credible. However, beyond these very special 
circumstances, societies rest on a general consensus that fooling should be avoided, 
and there are many rules, institutions and infrastructures to outlaw and make life 
difficult to those trying to fool their peers. Fooling others is indeed breaching plu-
rality. Beyond being inherently unfair, it leads to a “suspicion of all against all”, 
dissolves trust, prevents any form of togetherness and dissolves plurality. Fooling 
others knowingly and purposefully results de facto in a self-exclusion from the 
community of peers and from the ideal public space. These considerations hint to 
the fact that there is a link between trust, literacy and policy. It is part of literacy to 
distinguish socially acceptable fooling and unacceptable fooling. It is also part of 
23 http://www.cbc.ca/spark/2011/05/full-interview-siva-vaidhyanathan-on-the-googlization-of-
everything/.
24 Doug Belshaw is one of the scholars that have developed a very interesting perspective on what 
a digital literacy entails (e.g., on his book The Essential Elements of Digital Literacies).
25 This echoes with the notion of critical technology accompaniment proposed by Peter-Paul Ver-
beek in his chapter.
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literacy to be equipped to cope with or resist acceptable or basic fooling tentatives. 
In that respect, policy and regulation are only a complement to literacy and com-
mon sense.
With that modest attitude, it is important to rethink and actualise what fooling 
means in a hyperconnected era, particularly in view of the blurring between reality 
and virtuality26. There are at least two facets in this rethinking: (i) how do the “old” 
means of dealing with this issue survive in the hyperconnected world and (ii) are 
there new issues arising?
In the pre-digital world, the distinction between an original and a copy used to be 
a mean to counter fooling and to help each agent distinguishing “reality” from fake: 
in the digital world, the distinction between original and copy has lost the realistic 
dimension on which it has been established. Hence, for example, all measures that 
were built on this distinction need to be fundamentally rethought in a hypercon-
nected world27, to avoid perpetuating outdated distinctions, which stop being effec-
tive and lead to the proliferation of an absurd complexity. This is only mentioned as 
an example; here is not the place for jumping to concrete policy recommendations.
Beyond the dissolution of the distinction between original and copies, the hy-
perconnected era expands the possibilities for “reality theft”, in the following more 
fundamental way. In the pre-digital era, it is reasonably easy, for an agent, to dis-
tinguish if the environment encountered has been “made up” for, or tailored to, him 
or her. In these early days of the hyperconnected reality, where “we are all babies” 
when it comes to digital literacy, this distinction is much more difficult to make. 
Most of us are unable to distinguish if and when the price offered in an online en-
vironment or the result of a search depend from the use by the provider or by the 
search engine of personal data or profiling information, or if they would be the same 
for anybody else. Why does it matter? Let’s compare this to a pre-digital situation 
by imagining the following situation: I walk around in a shopping mall and stop in 
front of a dress I find beautiful. Imagine that the more I look at the dress the higher 
the price! I would be enraged and walk away, because I have the means to notice it. 
This is part of the pre-digital mix of literacy, policy and regulation. In the online en-
vironment, there is no equivalent easy and commonsensical way to identify if, when 
the price goes up, it is because the last seats of that flight (if I am booking a flight) 
have been taken by others, or if it is because the operator is making use of my desire 
to buy a flight ticket to raise the price. It is my view that people are entitled to know, 
when engaging on the web, if the result of their search or the price offered to them 
is making use of information about them, or not28. It has to do with fairness and dig-
nity, more than with privacy. It is also an enabler of plurality. There may be a role for 
policy-making to accompany and facilitate the deployment of an increased digital 
literacy, by ensuring that agents have the mean to orient themselves in a fair way in 
26 See Sect. 3A of the Onlife Background Note, Chap. 11.
27 This issue, among others, has been pointed to in a meeting discussing the societal perspective on 
cybersecurity http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ict/security/docs/societal.pdf.
28 The challenge of profiling is addressed more fully in Mireille Hildebrandt’s chapter.
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the online sphere and in the onlife experience. Here, the point is not to shape means 
of control, but rather to provide tools for enabling each one to orient him or herself.
6  Conclusion: Reclaiming Plurality
In this contribution, I have argued that acknowledging natality and embracing plu-
rality is a much-needed stance for making sense of what happens to us with the digi-
tal transition. Indeed, staying exclusively focused on an omniscience/omnipotence 
utopia, and the control-seeking perspective pervading it, prevents policy-makers 
and all other stakeholders from experiencing freedom in this emerging hypercon-
nected era and from benefitting of the societal intelligence and resilience. Those 
arguing for the need to seek more control often do so on the basis that failing to 
do so would lead us in a dangerous relativistic “anything goes” area. The fear of 
this “anything goes” is ignoring—at least—three essential features of the human 
condition, i.e., (i) that human beings are not only “goal seekers”, but also “meaning 
shapers”, (ii) that control-seekers are always short of their own expectations and 
sooner or later self-defeated, and (iii) that human beings have a conscience and 
host an inner dialogue, which is what makes plurality possible. If, by accident, this 
faculty of inner dialogue, which is nothing else but thought, would be denied so that 
we would all perceive others as merely functional beings, then indeed, it would be 
the end of the presence of human beings on earth29.
The three proposals of the Onlife Manifesto, i.e., the relational self, the literacy 
approach, and the need to care for attention, are not “ready-made” solutions meant 
to solve problems in an instrumental way. They are not items issued from some 
minds to be transmitted to other minds, like packages on a packet-switched net-
work. They are instead proposals that can bear fruits only after having been metabo-
lized by those receiving them.
The relational self denotes those in need of plurality, that is those beings with a 
satiety threshold, not reducible to their attributes or to a function, and whose iden-
tity is revealed by speech and action in presence of others. It points to the need of 
refraining from thinking about ourselves and the other selves in functional ways and 
recalling that others, like ourselves, are in need of meaning. The mutual interactions 
of relational selves give rise to the production of new meanings and affordances, 
which constitute the ground for the literacy of a society at a given time. Policies 
should be in resonance with and responsive to the development stage of that lit-
eracy. Last, attention is the best we have to offer to each other, it is what links to-
gether the fact of being oneself and of appearing to others; it is the fluid that makes 
plurality a reality: considering attention as a commodity to be merely captured and 
exchanged can only lead to a serious deterioration, if not a dissolution, of plurality.
29 This is one of my takes from Arendt’s Eichamnn in Jerusalem: a report on the banality of evil 
(1963).
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All this calls for policy-making to nurture a wide and inclusive understanding 
of the rationale of its action: besides interests, costs and benefits, optimisation and 
trade-offs, a key purpose of policy-making is to adapt the regulatory framework to 
meanings, norms and values as they emerge and crystallise in society, and to main-
tain and foster a vivid sense of natality and plurality. Indeed if, together with Arendt, 
we believe that the purpose of politics is freedom, it is high time to endorse and 
make sense of the world we are living in; it is high time to remember humans, and 
anybody else claiming an agent’s status, are deemed to be equal, singular and …in 
need of each other to be recognized as who they are. Plurality takes place among 
agents who recognize their satiety and interact in order to reveal their identity. It 
is high time for plurality to substitute, or at least complete, the other metaphors 
underlying policy-making, i.e. the invisible hand (which encourages the pursuit of 
one’s own interest, decoupled from all forms of empathy towards other selves) or 
the competitive race (which considers others as competitors to be defeated). Gen-
erationally speaking, the task of the “day” is, for all, to nurture a common under-
standing of what plurality means in a hyperconnected era, and for policy-makers, to 
partner with society, instead of parenting it!
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distri-
bution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source 
are credited.
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